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Abstract
Policy makers aim to avoid banking crises, and although they can to some extent
control domestic conditions, internationally transmitted crises are difficult to tackle.
This paper identifies international contagion in banking during the 2007- 2009 crisis
for 50 economies. We identify three channels of contagion - systematic, idiosyn-
cratic and volatility - and find evidence for these in 41 countries. Banking crises
are overwhelmingly associated with the presence of both systematic and idiosyn-
cratic contagion. The results reveal that crisis shocks transmitted from a foreign
jurisdiction via idiosyncratic contagion increase the likelihood of a systemic crisis in
the domestic banking system by almost 27 percent, whereas increased exposure via
systematic contagion does not necessarily destabilize the domestic banking system.
Thus while policy makers and regulatory authorities are rightly concerned with the
systematic transmission of banking crises, reducing the potential for idiosyncratic
contagion can importantly reduce the consequences for the domestic economy.
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1 Introduction
Banking crises are costly, and a great deal of prudential effort is undertaken to avoid
them. Bordo et al. (2001) estimate losses of around 6% of GDP associated with a banking
crises in the last quarter of the 20th century, and in the most recent period Laeven &
Valencia (2012) document losses of about 30% of GDP. Maintaining sound macroeconomic
fundamentals, a clear legal framework and strong prudential oversight are preventative
measures within the remit of domestic authorities. However, banking crises transmitted
from other jurisdictions present a considerable risk to the domestic economy (Kalemli-
Ozcan et al., 2013b), particularly as banking crises are often observed to precede even
more costly currency and debt crises (Laeven & Valencia, 2012; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008).
This paper empirically examines the evidence for the unexpected international trans-
mission of banking crises via stressful conditions in financial markets. These transmissions
are beyond those which would occur by the known spillovers between banking sectors in
different jurisdictions due to trading or portfolio links, and instead consist of contagion
effects; see also van Rijckeghem & Weder (2001),Bae et al. (2003); Bekaert et al. (2005);
Corsetti et al. (2005); Dungey et al. (2005); Forbes & Rigobon (2002); Iwatsubo & In-
agaki (2007). We find significant evidence not only for the existence of contagion, but
also for its role in promoting banking crises in regions geographically removed from the
crisis source. Thus, we contribute to the growing body of literature examining the role of
banks in the transmission of financial crisis of 2007-2009, most of whom find evidence of
international transmission via the banking sector (Allen et al., 2010; Brealey et al., 2012;
Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2013b; Popov & Udell, 2012).
The model encapsulates several potential channels of contagion and testable hypothe-
ses in a single framework. Specifically, it captures potential structural changes in global
systematic risk exposure (systematic contagion), additional US idiosyncratic shocks (id-
iosyncratic contagion), a structural shift (shift contagion), and additional US volatility
spillovers to other markets (volatility contagion). The latter captures the argument that
financial markets exhibit explosive volatility during crises that may spillover to other
markets (Edwards, 1998; Engle et al., 1990; Hamao et al., 1990). Using a standard factor
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model representation of an international CAPM framework, the model allows for spillover
effects outside crisis periods (Kim, 2001; Laxton & Prasad, 2000), volatility spillovers,
heteroskedasticity and skewness in the financial data with a nested EGARCH specifica-
tion. The framework is most closely related to the models of Baur (2012), Bekaert et al.
(2005), and Dungey et al. (2005). As the crisis is widely accepted to have originated in
the US we consider contagion effects from the US to 49 country banking sector indices -
covering both non-crisis and crisis conditions from 2001 to 2009.
There are two major results. First, we categorize the evidence for contagion between
the 50 banking sectors. The banking sectors in most economies experienced contagion
from the US in some form – that is systematic, idiosyncratic, shift or volatility – but not
necessarily all forms. About 60 percent of our sample banking market experienced a break
in global systematic risk exposure and about 60 percent of banking markets in our sample
experienced idiosyncratic contagion originating from the US banking market. While most
of the banking markets have volatility spillovers from the US banking market in non crisis
periods, only about 40 percent of sample banking markets experienced volatility contagion
during the crisis period. Finally, shift contagion is always accompanied by other forms of
contagion.
The second contribution links evidence on contagion to the occurrence of banking
crises. Linking our results for contagion with the systemic banking crisis data in Leaven
and Valencia (2012) reveals that crisis shocks transmitted from a foreign jurisdiction
via idiosyncratic contagion increase the likelihood of a systemic crisis in the domestic
banking system by almost 27 percent, whereas increased global systematic risk exposure
via systematic contagion does not necessarily destabilize the domestic banking system.
The existing literature argues that the probability of systemic banking crises is reduced by
stronger regulatory capital (Acharya et al., 2010; Berger & Bouwman, 2013; Cole, 2012;
Miles et al., 2013), the size of the banking sector and higher market concentration (Allen
& Gale, 2000; Beck et al., 2006; Bretschger et al., 2012; Mirzaei et al., 2013), and reduced
activity in the shadow banking sector (De Jonghe, 2010; Lepetit et al., 2008). We find
that stronger regulatory capital and retail banking activities lead to reduced probability
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of banking crisis even in the presence of contagion effects, but that while the impact of
higher market concentration is positive it is insignificant. The evidence suggests a larger
economic impact of stronger regulatory capital, which reduces the probability of crisis
by 11 percent, than for proportion of non-interest income in total income, which only
increases the probability of crisis by less than 1 percent. Likewise, domestic conditions
can help ameliorate the probability of crises, increased banking assets as a proportion of
GDP lower the the probability of crisis, but the economic impact is very small, at 0.1
percent. An increase in the external debt to GDP ratio also increases the probability of
crisis, by 1 percent, consistent with the hypothesis that a feedback loop exists between
sovereign debt and banking crises, (Acharya et al., 2011; Adler, 2012).
Our results argue that systematic contagion effects are being adequately tackled with
current policy responses – they are not significantly affecting the probability of a domestic
banking crisis emerging as a result of a crisis elsewhere. However, there is scope for
further reduction in banking crises promoted by international linkages via idiosyncratic
contagion. Idiosyncratic contagion occurs in response to unanticipated country-specific
banking sector shocks, and represents the transmission of these shocks other than via
usual linkages such as portfolios or trading links which are present during non-crisis
periods also, but perhaps consistent with arguments around herding behavior. Potentially
there is gain for regulators and policy makers to consider how to creatively respond to calm
these transmissions and extra vulnerability generated in one economy, but unexpectedly
transmitting to another.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we propose a model to test
for several forms of contagion and describes the sample and data. Section 3 provides the
results for contagion. In Section 4 we examine the cross-section of systemic banking crisis
and Section 5 concludes the paper.
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2 Modeling Financial Contagion
2.1 The Empirical Framework
In modern banking systems, banking institutions are often globally integrated through
both on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet linkages. These global linkages make the
banking sector potentially more exposed to global systematic risk than other sectors.
The financial sector is known to be highly globally integrated at sectoral level (Bekaert
et al., 2009). We postulate that in a globally integrated banking system the exposure
of banks in a given country to global systematic risk depends on the extent of global
integration of the banking system.1
Let ri,t represents the return for banking sector of country i at time t. A standard
international market model representation of asset returns takes the following form:
ri,t = a0,i + a1,if
global
t + ei,t, (1)
where f global refers to global factor or common shock and can be proxied by the return
on the aggregate global banking sector index and a1,i measures the global systematic risk
exposure of banking sector of country i .
Crises may be associated with structural changes in the global systematic risk ex-
posure of banking markets through a number of possible channels. For example, the
interbank market may not function properly during the crisis period; the existing net-
work of relationship across the market participants may break down, or the failure of
a few financial institutions may have systemic impact on other banks. The potential
increased exposure of banks to global systematic risk during a crisis period is denoted as
systematic contagion, and is analogous to a common shocks effect or fundamentals based
contagion (Baur, 2012; Bekaert et al., 2005, 2011) as revealed in Equation (2) below:
ri,t = a0,i + a1,if
global
t + a2,if
global
t It + εi,t, (2)
1See Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013b) for a recent theoretical contribution.
5
where It is an indicator function that takes value 0 during the normal period and 1 during
a crisis period. The coefficient a2,i captures the changes in global systematic risk exposure
during the crisis period.
Policy intervention in the financial system during crisis periods is often specifically
designed to reduce an individual country’s global systematic risk exposure. If the policy
measures were effective, then the global systematic risk exposure of a given banking
market may have been reduced during the crisis instead of increased.2 This is akin to
the debate around whether increased international financial integration may or may not
contribute to increased output correlation (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2013a,b).
The existing literature suggests that US shocks have a significant influence on other
economies during calm periods, reflecting its market leadership in many segments of
the economy, its influence in portfolios, and the position of the US dollar as a global
reserve currency. Following Masson (1999), we denote these as spillover effects. However,
during a period of stress, shocks from the crisis originating economy may impact over and
above these spillovers, denoted as idiosyncratic contagion, (Dungey et al., 2005; Dungey
& Martin, 2007). In the current paper we denote the US banking sector as the crucible
of the crisis and consider the evidence for idiosyncratic contagion from the US to other
markets. Finally, Forbes & Rigobon (2002) argue that a crisis may bring a structural shift
in the existing relationships above and beyond that accounted for by structural breaks
in factor relationships; potentially attributable to herding behavior amongst investors
which does not depend on economic fundamentals (Bekaert et al., 2011).3 Our final
levels specification captures each of these channels as follows:
rj,t = bj,0+b1,jf
global
t +b2,jf
global
t It+b3,jf
US
t +b4,jf
US
t It+b5,jIt+ξj,t; j = 1, ..., n−1 6= US
(3)
where the US factor, fUS, is extracted as the residual from applying equation (2) to
i = US, thus orthogonalizing the global and US factors. In Eq. (3), the coefficient
2However, the alternative to reduced global exposure is not necessarily proof of lack of policy efficacy
as we do not have a true proxy of what the outcome would have been in the absence of policy actions.
3Bekaert et al. (2011) refer this as “herding contagion”.
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b1,j represents a standard CAPM beta coefficient against global markets, b2,j represents
systemic contagion, b3,j measures the general spillover effects of US shocks, b4,j measures
the additional effects of US shocks during the crisis period, that is idiosyncratic contagion,
and b5,j captures any intercept shift in the factor model representation or shift contagion
during the crisis period.
2.2 The GARCH framework and measuring volatility contagion
Financial returns series generally exhibit heteroskedasticity. To capture this we incorpo-
rate the exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (EGARCH)
model of Nelson (1991), which has the advantage that it does not require non-negativity
constraints on parameters. GARCH(1,1) is usually sufficient to capture the financial data
properties (Engle, 1982; Hansen & Lunde, 2005). The variance equation of the EGARCH
model (to accompany mean equations given in equations (1-3)) can be expressed as:
ln(σ2i,t) = c0,i + c1,i(|zi,t−1| − E|zi,t−1|) + c2,izi,t−1 + c3,iln(σ2i,t−1);
zi,t−1 = ηi,t−1/σi,t−1; ηi,t = {ei,t, εi,t, ξj,t}
ηi,t ∼ Student− t(0, σ2i,t).
(4)
To capture the US volatility spillover effects in the variance equation of the non-US
markets, the variance equation those markets takes the following form:
ln(σ2j,t) = c0,j + c1,j(|zj,t−1| − E|zj,t−1|) + c2,jzj,t−1 + c3,jln(σ2j,t−1)
+pi1,jln(σˆ
2
us,t) + pi2,jln(σˆ
2
us,t)It; j = 1, ..., n− 1 6= US.
(5)
In Eq. (5), the parameter estimate pi1,j captures the general US volatility spillover
and pi2,j captures additional US volatility spillover for market j during the crisis period
which we denote as volatility contagion. The GARCH framework provided in Eq. (5)
is motivated by Hamao et al. (1990); Engle et al. (1990); Edwards (1998); Iwatsubo &
Inagaki (2007), amongst others.
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2.3 Sample, Data and Crisis period
The data set comprise daily banking sector indices for 50 countries including the US
for January 2, 2001 to May 8, 2009 available in Thompson Datastream. The aggregate
world banking sector index return provides the global factor.4 In line with existing lit-
erature, we use two-day rolling moving averages to deal with differing time zones and
asynchronous trading times as in Forbes & Rigobon (2002), and adjust time/date as Day
01 in US/Americas = Day 2 in Asia and Europe. We follow the approach of Wang &
Nguyen Thi (2012) and define the crisis period endogenously using the Iterative Cumula-
tive Sum of Square (ICSS) algorithm based on the CUSUM test to detect the structural
change in variance of an individual return series (Inclan & Tiao, 1994; Sanso et al., 2004)
and use the identified break in the US banking sector index return to determine the crisis
period. Using this procedure the endogenously chosen crisis period is from July 19, 2007
to May 08, 2009. These dates are consistent with the existing literature, see Bekaert
et al. (2011) and the extensive overview of dates provided in Dungey et al. (2013). Table
1 provides the list of banking markets considered in this study.
3 Contagion Results and Discussion
The resulting evidence for contagion is reported in Table 2. Almost all of the 49 indi-
vidual banking markets have statistically significant and positive systematic comovement
with the global banking market throughout the sample, evidenced by b1 6= 0, indicating
exposure to global systematic risk. The parameter estimates support that the level of
global integration is higher for advanced countries, consistent with evidence in Laeven &
Valencia (2012). These cross-border linkages may reflect both on and off balance sheet
channels (Cetorelli & Goldberg, 2011; Sbracia & Zaghini, 2003).
The results provide evidence for the severity of disruptions in the 2007-2009 crisis.
Exposure to the global systematic risk factor changed significantly for 29 of the 49 coun-
4The series used is Datastream mnemonic bankswd. The literature suggests that banking and in-
surance sectors have high level of global integration at sectoral level (Bekaert et al., 2009) and industry
factors dominate country factors while explaining the equity returns (Cavaglia et al., 2000). The results
are robust to the alternative of using the aggregate world equity index (totmkwd) as the global factor.
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Table 1: List of banking markets considered
America Europe
1 Argentina 24 Austria
2 Brazil 25 Belgium
3 Canada 26 Bulgaria
4 Chile 27 Cyprus
5 Mexico 28 Czech Rep
6 Peru 29 Denmark
7 Venezuela 30 Finland
8 US 31 France
Asia 32 Germany
9 Australia 33 Greece
10 China 34 Hungary
11 Hong Kong 35 Ireland
12 India 36 Italy
13 Indonesia 37 Luxemburg
14 Israel 38 Malta
15 Japan 39 Netherlands
16 Korea 40 Norway
17 Malaysia 41 Poland
18 Pakistan 42 Portugal
19 Philippine 43 Romania
20 Singapore 44 Russia
21 Sri Lanka 45 Slovenia
22 Taiwan 46 Spain
23 Thailand 47 Sweden
48 Switzerland
49 Turkey
50 UK
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tries, that is b2 6= 0 as reported in Table 3, consistent with these markets experiencing
systematic contagion during the crisis, and prior evidence on structural breaks in the
relationship with global conditions during crisis periods (Dornbusch et al., 2000; Dungey
et al., 2005). However, this evidence is strongly skewed towards the developing markets.
Many of the advanced markets either did not experience a structural break, that is the
hypothesis of b2 = 0 is not rejected in France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Norway, Portugal and
the UK. We cannot distinguish here whether the policy actions undertaken were sufficient
to offset any potential change, or whether no change was experienced. In Japan, Ger-
many, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, the results go further in that the
hypothesis that b2 < 0 is not rejected. In these countries the potential for an increased
factor loading (b2) during the crisis observed in other jurisdictions was not present, and
this may reflect that their policy initiatives were effective in suppressing the transmission
of the crisis to the domestic banking system, in line with the findings of Ait-Sahalia et al.
(2012).
Four countries did not have a significant link with the global factor during the pre-crisis
period, that is b1 = 0. This potentially reflects that each of these countries, Bulgaria,
Peru, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela, is a relatively small and closed market. However, during
the crisis, this was no longer the case for Peru and Bulgaria, (b2 6= 0) and they were
exposed to global conditions, although Sri Lanka and Venezuela continued to remain
isolated in this respect.
In addition to responding to global conditions, the majority of markets also experi-
enced spillovers from the US during the non-crisis periods. Of the 49 markets, 29 experi-
enced idiosyncratic shock effects from the US banking market, evidenced by b3 6= 0. The
notable exceptions are a mixture of advanced banking markets (Australia, Austria, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Korea, Norway, Portugal and Taiwan) and emerg-
ing banking markets (China, Indonesia, Hungary, Malaysia, Poland, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
Turkey and Venezuela). When this parameter is negative, it indicates the potential for
portfolio diversification benefits relative to the US, which is the case for a mixture of
advanced markets such as Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, and Slovenia and emerging mar-
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kets such as Brazil, Chile, India,(Allen & Gale, 2000; Beck et al., 2006; Bretschger et al.,
2012; Mirzaei et al., 2013), Pakistan, and Philippines. However, this effect appears to be
dampened during the crisis, as the US idiosyncratic effects have an overwhelmingly pos-
itive transmission to these markets. The hypothesis test of b3 + b4 = 0 is not rejected in
most of these markets. The Brazilian and Peruvian markets appear to have consistently
negative response to US originated shocks even during the crisis period, consistent with
recent evidence that the Latin American banking market was little effected by the GFC
(Kamil & Rai, 2010; Ocampo, 2009).
Almost all of the banking sectors show evidence of volatility spillover effects during the
non-crisis period, supporting the contention that the inclusion of volatility transmission
is important in the model specification.5 During the non-crisis period the countries which
do not experience volatility spillovers are two Asian markets - China and Pakistan and two
Latin American markets - Argentina and Peru. Clearly, the overall evidence presented
here supports the banking sector in Peru as relatively isolated from international capital
markets.
The crisis also caused a structural shift as specified in Eq. (3), that is b5 = 0 is
rejected for 23 of the 49 countries. Each of these countries also have evidence of a break
in the structural parameters (b2, b4 or pi2). The evidence for structural shifts during the
crisis period are consistent with the occurrence of herding behavior in addition to global
shocks and the US idiosyncratic shocks during the GFC.
3.1 Evidence of Contagion
Table 3 shows that almost all of the 49 banking markets in the sample experienced
some form of contagion from the US. The null of no contagion in any form - systematic,
idiosyncratic or volatility - given by the joint test for b2 = b4 = pi2 = 0, is rejected
in most cases.6 The exceptions are Hong Kong, Hungary, Israel, Malaysia, Singapore,
5The statistically significant parameter estimates for c1 and c2 for most of the markets support the
EGARCH specification in Eq (5).
6We also consider potential joint tests incorporating b5, such as b2 = b4 = b5 = pi2 = 0; b2 = b4 =
b5 = 0. The results are similar as b5 is always accompanied some other contagion estimates (b2,b4, or
pi2).
11
Taiwan, and Venezuela. These markets are generally small economies although with a
great variety of exposure to international markets. Israel, for example, is an isolated small
developed market. The exception is Malaysia, a relatively large economy, which had built
significant buffers in the aftermath of the Asian crisis of 1997-98, and a banking system
with negligible exposure to US sub-prime loan products (Khoon & Mah-Hui, 2010). Also
in Asia, the financial hub of Singapore, had liquid and well capitalized domestic banks
and foreign banks with liquidity assurance from their head office (a formal commitment
required for licensing procedure) which reduced the exposure of the Singaporean banking
sector to contagion. Hong Kong, and Hungary represent somewhat different cases in
that the null hypothesis for the joint test (b2 = b4 = pi2 = 0) is not rejected but the
null hypothesis for individual univariate tests of contagion effects are rejected. In the
case of Hong Kong, the null of no systemic contagion b2 = 0 , is rejected; and in the
case of Hungary, the null of no idiosyncratic contagion, b4 = 0, is rejected. Despite
the overall evidence for no contagion, the Hong Kong banking sector displays sensitivity
to global shocks (fundamentals), and the Hungarian banking sector to US idiosyncratic
shocks. Our results for the banking sectors in these countries are consistent with the
IMF Country Report 2008 and 2009 for these countries which suggest that their banking
sectors performed well during the crisis, an outcome often attributed in the discourse to
effective policy initiatives.
Figure 1 provides a schematic representation of the clustering of the different individ-
ual coefficient hypothesis testing results, for systematic contagion, idiosyncratic contagion
and volatility contagion, providing a convenient means of discussion. The distinction be-
tween bold and plain text relates to the links to identified systemic banking crises to be
discussed below.
3.1.1 Volatility contagion driven
A small group of countries (Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Russia and Sri Lanka) have con-
tagion effects driven largely by volatility contagion. These countries do not have level
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Figure 1: Univariate hypothesis test
effects - that is no evidence of either systematic contagion or idiosyncratic contagion.7
With the exception of Sri Lanka, the countries in this group are markets which were in-
volved in financial crises during the 1990s and might have learned from that experience.
However, the high level of market uncertainty caused by the GFC resulted in increased
market volatility in these countries. The literature suggests that the banking systems in
Indonesia and Korea particularly were relatively healthy and had less exposure to US sub-
prime products (IMF, 2009a,b). In the case of Mexico, although the aggregate economy
was hit hard, the banking sector was relatively resilient during the crisis (IMF, 2009c).
3.1.2 Systematic contagion driven
A further small group of countries (Canada, Germany, Peru, and Spain) have evidence
of contagion effects driven largely by systematic contagion. These are large advanced
economies (except Peru which is a small closed economy) with strong international bank-
7When we look at univariate hypothesis testing, however, the null for no idiosyncratic contagion
(b4 = 0) is rejected for Mexico
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ing linkages. It may be that these linkages are sufficient to enable systematic contagion to
effect the domestic markets. None of these market experienced idiosyncratic contagion.
Despite the fact that German banking sector experienced huge losses - about 57 percent
of stock market capitalization for banking sector stocks - and German banks were highly
involved in asset backed securities, we do not find a statistically significant result for
idiosyncratic contagion from the US to Germany. The German banking system forms
the basis of its capital markets, and during the crisis German banks faced problems with
leverage, liquidity and funding (Acharya & Schnabl, 2010).
In Spain, the direct impact of the crisis on the banking sector was limited as the banks
had a retail-oriented business model and negligible exposure to US sub-prime mortgages
(Acharya & Schnabl, 2010; IMF, 2009d). However, when the crisis spread to the global
financial conditions and the real sector, the crisis was transmitted to the Spanish banking
sector through common conditions such as tighter liquidity. The Spanish banking sector
additionally experienced volatility contagion in response to the higher turmoil in the US
markets.
In the case of the Canadian banking system, despite its close proximity to US (with
strong real and financial linkages), it avoided crisis effects. Canadian banks follow rela-
tively conservative banking practices with strong prudential regulation, and consequently
had lower exposure to sub-prime effects than the US (IMF, 2009e).
3.1.3 Idiosyncratic contagion driven
In about one-fifth of the countries US idiosyncratic shocks played a dominant role during
the crisis. Countries in this group have a high level of global integration, are advanced
and relatively large European countries (Czech Republic, France, Greece, Italy, Malta,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, and UK) and Japan and Chile. Countries in this group did not
generally experience systematic contagion (except Czech Republic and Japan) or volatility
contagion (except Portugal). Since the banking fundamentals of these countries were
generally strong (Chile, Japan, France, and Italy), and banks follow a traditional retail
business model, these banking systems were relatively resilient to the crisis. Consequently,
16
the large drop in the banking sector returns during the crisis was directly attributable to
the idiosyncratic shocks originating in the US banking sector.
3.1.4 Multiple drivers
The final group consists of all those countries where the null of joint hypotheses (bi-
variate and multivariate test) is rejected in all cases. All the countries in this group
experience systematic contagion and the majority of the countries are part of the Euro-
pean Union. Seven countries (Australia, Finland, India, Luxemburg, Romania, Sweden
and Turkey) have all effects, that is the null hypothesis is rejected in univariate, bivariate
and multivariate hypothesis tests. Five countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, and
Thailand) have no idiosyncratic contagion from the US (univariate test) and 10 countries
(Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines,
Slovenia, and Switzerland) have no volatility contagion.
4 Contagion and the Systemic Banking Crises
4.1 Contagion and the cost of crisis
We couple the evidence for contagion in the banking system with the recording banking
system crisis data in Laeven & Valencia (2012) to address relationship between channels
of contagion and the presence and cost of banking crises. Of the 41 banking markets in
our sample which experienced contagion in any form, 18 banking markets experienced a
banking system crisis during the GFC as documented in Laeven & Valencia (2012). The
average output loss for these countries is about 30 percent of GDP and the average fiscal
cost is about 7 percent of GDP.8
Figure 1 highlights the countries classified by channels of contagion which experienced
8Laeven & Valencia (2012) consider a banking crisis as a systemic if (i) there is a financial distress (as
indicated by bank runs, losses in banking system, and/or bank liquidations), and (ii) there is a policy
intervention in response to significant losses in banking system. Output losses are computed as the
cumulative sum of the differences between actual and trend real GDP over the crisis period and the fiscal
costs are defined as the component of gross fiscal outlays related to the restructuring of the financial
sector. They include fiscal costs associated with bank recapitalization but exclude asset purchases and
direct liquidity assistance from the treasury. See Laeven & Valencia (2012) for details.
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Table 3: Cost of systemic banking system crisis
Output Fiscal Output Fiscal
loss cost loss cost
Systematic and idiosyncratic Idiosyncratic only
Austria 14 4.9 France 23 1
Belgium 19 6 Greece 43 27.3
Denmark 36 3.1 Hungary 40 2.7
Ireland 106 40.7 Italy 32 0.3
Netherlands 23 12.7 UK 25 8.8
Slovenia 38 3.6 Average 32.6 8.0
Switzerland 0 1.1 St. dev. 8.8 11.3
Average 33.7 10.3
St. dev. 34.4 13.9 Systematic and volatility
Average (excl. Swiss) 39.3 11.8 Spain 39 3.8
St. dev. 34.0 14.6
All forms of contagion
Systematic only Luxembourg 36 7.7
Germany 11 1.8 Sweden 25 0.7
Average 30.5 4.2
Idiosyncratic and volatility stdev 7.8 4.9
Portugal 37 0
Overall
Volatility only Average 30.4 7.1
Russia 0 2.3 St. dev. 23.0 10.6
Note: Output loss and fiscal cost are expressed in percent of GDP. Data source: (Laeven & Valencia, 2012)
systemic banking crises in emphasized bold. The majority of the countries which experi-
enced a banking crisis are clustered in two groups; either experiencing both idiosyncratic
and systematic contagion (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Slovenia,
Switzerland) or idiosyncratic contagion only (France, Greece, Hungary, Italy and the
UK). Seven of 12 countries in the systematic and idiosyncratic contagion group experi-
enced a banking crisis. Table 3 shows shows that the average output loss (as a proportion
of GDP) for these countries was almost 34 percent, and when we exclude Switzerland,
which experienced no output loss, this rises to around 39 percent. The standard deviation
of the output loss in this group is high, at 34 percent. The five countries which experience
a banking crisis with only idiosyncratic contagion have a similar output loss of 33 percent,
but a much lower standard deviation of this loss at almost 9 percent. The other forms
of contagion associate less strongly with banking crises than these two categories, with
volatility contagion relatively unimportant.
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The evidence from Figure 1 and Table 3 indicates that banking crises in this sample
are frequently associated with idiosyncratic contagion - which tends to result in output
loss. However, when this is coupled with the presence of systematic contagion, then there
is great uncertainty about the output loss, in our sample the output loss for this group
ranges from nothing in Switzerland to 106 percent of GDP in Ireland. In contrast, when
only idiosyncratic contagion is associated with a banking crisis, the range for output loss
is smaller, between 20 and 40 percent of GDP.
The fiscal costs associated with the countries in banking crisis do not show this dis-
tinction between the dominant types of contagion; the average fiscal costs are 8 percent
or 10 percent of GDP for countries with both systemic and idiosyncratic contagion or
idiosyncratic contagion only. These results point to the importance of understanding
the source of contagion and its links to banking crises. For policy makers, it appears
that the maximum uncertainty about the outcome of a banking crisis occurs when both
idiosyncratic and systematic contagion affect the market.
4.2 Contagion, industry characteristics and the systemic crises
In this section we formalize the discussion from previous section and examine the em-
pirical evidence for the transmission of banking crises via different contagion channels
incorporating industry characteristics as control variables using a Probit model as fol-
lows:
Pr(BankCrisisi = 1) = Φ(γo +X
′
iλ+W
′
i θ + Z
′
iδ) (6)
where Xi, is a vector of indicator variables representing the contagion measures identified
in previous section, taking the value of 1 when that contagion channel is statistically sig-
nificant in the first stage regressions (we exclude the volatility channel as it is completely
coincident with all occurrences and non-occurrences of crisis), Wi, is a vector of banking
industry characteristics, and Zi, is a vector of macroeconomic control variables; λ, θ, and
δ are the vectors of weights on each of these effects, and Φ is the cumulative distribution
function of a standard normal random variable. The data for banking industry character-
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istics and control variables are from Cihak et al. (2012) and available from World Bank
website.9 Motivated by Beck et al. (2006), Berger & Bouwman (2013), and Lepetit et al.
(2008), we consider the market concentration ratio (given by the market share of the 3
largest banks), the bank capital ratio (ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets),
and bank income structure (non-interest income to total income ratio) to characterize
the banking industry.10 We use the relative size of the banking sector (ratio of banking
sector assets to GDP) and external debt exposure (ratio of total external debt outstand-
ing to GDP) as macroeconomic control variables. The control variables are kept at their
pre-crisis period average.11 A detailed data description is provided in Cihak et al. (2012)
or on the Global Financial Development Database of the World Bank website.
Three specifications of the model are presented in Table 4. Specification (1) presents
the coefficient estimates and marginal effects where only contagion channels are present,
specification (2) when only market control variables are applied and specification (3) the
full specification with the full set of X,W,Z variables.
The probit model results reported in Table 4 support the hypothesis that idiosyncratic
contagion is an important avenue for systemic banking crises. The presence of idiosyn-
cratic contagion (a shock transmitted from the crisis originating country), increases the
probability of systemic banking crisis in a country by almost 27 percent. The contribu-
tion of systematic contagion, however is not statistically significant at conventional levels
suggesting that increased interdependence among banking sectors through global factor
does not necessarily destabilize the domestic banking system. This does not necessarily
mean that the potential for systematic contagion should be paid less attention by policy
makers; the evidence suggests that policy issues taken during the global financial crisis
contributed to reduced tail risk in the financial system (Ait-Sahalia et al., 2012; Gagnon
et al., 2011; Klyuev et al., 2009). However, our results do suggest that there remains
significant evidence that crises transmitted via idiosyncratic shocks may destabilize the
domestic financial system, and policies designed to reduce the potential for idiosyncratic
9http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-financial-development
10For robustness, we consider the alternatives of the 5 largest banks based concentration ratio and the
ratio of bank equity capital to total asset to proxy for bank capital. The results are very similar.
11The results are robust to keeping control variables at 2006 level.
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contagion may result in reduced impact on domestic economies.
We specifically test the hypotheses in the existing literature that larger, more concen-
trated banking sectors with lower engagement in shadow banking activities and higher
regulatory capital will have lower probability of crisis occurrence (see (Allen & Gale,
2000; Beck et al., 2006; Bretschger et al., 2012; Mirzaei et al., 2013), (Acharya et al.,
2010; Berger & Bouwman, 2013; Cole, 2012; Miles et al., 2013), and (De Jonghe, 2010;
Lepetit et al., 2008), respectively). The results indicate support for the hypothesis that
higher regulatory bank capital reduces the likelihood of a systemic banking crisis by about
11 percent. However, higher market concentration results in only an economically small
reduction in the probability of a crisis, statistically significant at the 10 percent level;
providing only limited support for the hypothesis that market concentration decreases
the systemic risk, and the size of the banking sector (given by the banking sector to GDP
ratio) has no significant effect. While the results for the non-interest income to total
income ratio variable are not uniformly significant, the marginal effects in specification
(3) indicate that where the banking sector engages less in retail banking activities and
more in shadow banking activities the probability of a systemic crisis is increased. Fi-
nally, the statistically significant (at 10 percent) marginal impact of the external debt to
GDP ratio on the probability of banking crisis supports the hypothesised feedback loop
between sovereign debt and banking crises (Acharya et al., 2011; Adler, 2012).
In summary, the results show that the existence of idiosyncratic contagion during
a crisis provides a statistically significant contribution to increasing the probability of
a banking crisis in the recipient country, of 27 percent. This is a substantial channel,
and worthy of policymakers attention in their attempts to mitigage the effects of foreign
sourced crises on domestic economies. The usual finding that good macroeconomic policy
settings, such as influence the debt to GDP ratio, are confirmed. As the literature sug-
gests, higher regulatory capital can play a significant offsetting role in reducing banking
crises, but proposals around the size of the sector and relative engagement in shadow
banking are economically significant determinants in this analysis.
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5 Conclusions
This paper implements a CAPM based modeling framework that encapsulates several
alternative channels of contagion and relates them to the observed evidence for bank-
ing crises for 50 countries during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. We determine
that banking crises are strongly positively related to evidence of idiosyncratic contagion
channels from the crisis originating countries. Idiosyncratic contagion represents the
unanticipated impact of shocks affecting the crisis originating asset, in this case the US
banking sector, and transmitted to other banking sectors. It is differentiated from the
transmission of common shocks which hit the global markets, which may originate in
the US, but can be identified by their very commonality, which we denote as systematic
contagion. It also differs from general shifts in the market conditions, known as shift
contagion, and transmission via changes in market volatility, or volatility contagion. The
framework implemented here distinguishes each of these four channels of contagion and
finds that although there appears to be clustered evidence for effects of both systematic
and idiosyncratic contagion on the probability of banking crises, statistically, only the
links with idiosyncratic contagion are significant. It is entirely possible that this result
partly arises from the efforts of policy makers around the globe to contain the systematic
effects of the crisis, thus dampening the systematic channel.
Our results provide evidences for the severity of 2007-2009 crisis. Banking sectors
across the world were disturbed by the crisis and were not immune to contagion effects.
About 60 percent of the sample banking markets experienced a break in global system-
atic risk exposure, and about 60 percent of banking markets experienced idiosyncratic
contagion originating from the US banking market. While most banking markets show
evidence of volatility spillovers from the US banking markets during periods of market
calm, only about 40 percent of sample banking markets experienced volatility contagion
during the crisis. We established that evidence of a banking crisis seemed to be related
to two clusters of economies - one which experienced both systematic and idiosyncratic
crises, and one which experienced idiosyncratic contagion only. While the average output
loss effect of banking crises on these two groups of countries was quite similar, at about
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one-third, the standard deviation of this loss was very different. The group of countries
which experienced only idiosyncratic contagion were more likely to experience an average
loss - that is the range of output loss experienced was much smaller than the countries
where systematic contagion was also significant.
The idiosyncratic shocks channel is empirically an important link in transmitting
shocks across international banking sectors, strongly related to the subsequent occur-
rence of a banking crisis in the recipient country. Concentrated banking sectors, strong
regulatory capital requirements and a concentration in retail banking income help to re-
duce the likelihood of systemic crisis, consistent with the existing evidence. However,
there is evidently more that can be done by policy in identifying and defusing the trans-
mission of country specific idiosyncratic shocks that are potential sources of idiosyncratic
contagion so as to reduce the costs of any consequent banking crises.
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